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CONTENTSAbstract
We discuss the notion of liquidity and liquidity risk within the ￿nancial
system. We distinguish between three di⁄erent liquidity types, central bank
liquidity, funding and market liquidity and their relevant risks. In order
to understand the workings of ￿nancial system liquidity, as well as the role
of the central bank, we bring together relevant literature from di⁄erent areas
and review liquidity linkages among these three types in normal and turbulent
times. We stress that the root of liquidity risk lies in information asymmetries
and the existence of incomplete markets. The role of central bank liquidity
can be important in managing a liquidity crisis, yet it is not a panacea. It can
act as an immediate but temporary bu⁄er to liquidity shocks, thereby allowing
time for supervision and regulation to confront the causes of liquidity risk.
JEL classi￿cation: G10, G20.
Keywords: liquidity, risk, central bank, LLR
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Financial liquidity is an elusive notion, yet of paramount importance for the well-
functioning of the ￿nancial system. In fact, the events in ￿nancial markets since
August 2007 bear all the hallmarks of increased funding liquidity risk, but also reveal
how this type of risk can contaminate market liquidity and necessitate reactions from
central banks. This project combines literature on liquidity from various ￿elds of
research in a schematic and holistic way in order to provide a uni￿ed and consistent
account of ￿nancial system liquidity and liquidity risk. The outcome of this e⁄ort
reveals the following:
Three main liquidity notions, namely central bank liquidity, market liquidity and
funding liquidity are de￿ned and discussed. Their complex and dynamic linkages
can give us a good understanding of the liquidity workings in the ￿nancial system
and reveal positive or negative e⁄ects for ￿nancial stability, depending on the levels
of liquidity risk prevailing.
The causes of liquidity risk lie on departures from the complete markets and
symmetric information paradigm, which can lead to moral hazard and adverse se-
lection. To the extent that such conditions persist, liquidity risk is endemic in the
￿nancial system and can cause a vicious link between funding and market liquidity,
prompting systemic liquidity risk. It is exactly this type of market risk that typi-
cally alerts policy makers, because of its potential to destabilise the ￿nancial system.
In such cases emergency liquidity provisions can be a tool to restore balance.
The central bank has the ability and the obligation to minimise the real costs
of liquidations and the probability of a ￿nancial system meltdown. However, the
role of central bank liquidity in such turbulent periods does not have guaranteed
success, as it cannot tackle the roots of liquidity risk. In fact, the potential bene￿ts
are limited by the fact that the central bank cannot distinguish between illiquid
and insolvent banks with certainty. Therefore, it should only focus on halting
(temporarily) the vicious circle between funding and market liquidity. The tradeo⁄
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the central bank has to decide on its liquidity providing strategy. This task is not
easy and there is no established rule of thumb.
In order to eliminate systemic liquidity risk, greater transparency of liquidity
management practices in needed. Supervision and regulation are the fundamen-
tal weapons against systemic liquidity risk. These practices can tackle the root
of liquidity risk by minimising asymmetric information and moral hazard through
e⁄ective monitoring mechanisms of the ￿nancial system. In this way it is easier
to distinguish between solvent and illiquid agents and therefore impose liquidity
cushions to the ones most in need. This would also help markets become more
complete. However, such mechanisms can be costly, due to the amount of informa-
tion that needs to be gathered. They should, therefore, be run by the most cost
e¢ cient and result-e⁄ective agent.
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￿The word liquidity has so many facets that is often counter-productive to use it
without further and closer de￿nition￿
Charles Goodhart (BdF, 2008)
Financial liquidity is an elusive notion, yet of paramount importance for the well-
functioning of the ￿nancial system. Indeed a quick view into the ￿nancial market
tensions since August 2007 stress this point. These tensions appeared as liquidity
in money markets declined signi￿cantly (see Figure 1), following credit rationing
in the interbank markets. This was due to the fact that banks refused to lend to
each other because of funding liquidity problems relating to uncertainty over their
exposure to structured products. The amount of exposure was a signi￿cant consid-
eration because market liquidity of these structured assets had declined signi￿cantly,
thereby reinforcing di¢ culties in valuing such products. As a result, central banks
intervened and injected liquidity into the markets. This short exposition reveals im-
portant insights. To begin with, ￿nancial markets liquidity can take many di⁄erent
facets - such as market liquidity (interbank and asset market), funding liquidity and
central bank liquidity. More importantly, in order to understand ￿nancial system
liquidity, one needs to look closer at the various forms of liquidity in the ￿nancial
system and the linkages among them.
7
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This project di⁄ers from the current literature on liquidity. The academic
literature up-to-date has looked at various liquidity types and has recorded broad
linkages between them. However, it mainly treated the di⁄erent concepts of liquidity
in a rather fragmented way, because it aimed at explaining issues not necessarily
related to ￿nancial liquidity and liquidity linkages1. In other words, it mainly used
various notions of liquidity and fragmented parts of their linkages as input for the
analysis of various other issues. As a result, it has yet to provide an analysis of
the various liquidity types into a context focused only on liquidity. This project
1For example central bank liquidity is typically discussed in the context of monetary policy
implementation, but also enters into the lender of last resort literature. Market liquidity is typ-
ically seen separately in the asset pricing literature, and funding liquidity is usually discussed in
the context of liquidity management. More recently, links between funding and market liquidity
have been recorded in the theoretical and empirical literature (Brunnemeier and Pedersen, 2007;
Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2008).
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liquidity (risk) by concentrating, condensing and re-interpreting a broad spectrum
of available literature results.
More speci￿cally this project presents a coherent liquidity framework where it
di⁄erentiates between the various liquidity types, appropriately de￿nes them and
brings forward the linkages among them (i.e. describe the transmission channels
and spill-over directions among these types). Namely, it describes liquidity ￿ ows in
the ￿nancial system by examining the linkages between three broad liquidity types:
central bank liquidity, market liquidity and funding liquidity. The ￿rst relates to
the liquidity provided by the central bank, the second to the ability of trading in
the markets, and the third to the ability of banks to fund their positions. It then
discusses the de￿nitions and properties of each liquidity (risk) type and integrates
theoretical ￿ndings and empirical evidence in the up-to-date literature to present a
structured view of the liquidity ￿ ows among these three types under smooth and
under turbulent times. In so doing, it explains how these linkages and liquidity
transmission channels are a⁄ected by liquidity risk and exposes the causes of the
latter.
This project suggests two important policy implications. Liquidity linkages
among the various liquidity types are strong. In normal times (times of low liq-
uidity risk) such linkages promote a virtuous circle in the ￿nancial system liquidity,
guaranteeing the smooth functioning of the ￿nancial system. In turbulent times
(times of high liquidity risk) the linkages remain strong, but now become propa-
gation channels of liquidity risk in the ￿nancial system, leading to a vicious circle
which might end up destabilising the ￿nancial system. The role of central bank
liquidity together with supervision and regulation are of paramount importance in
restoring stability to the system. Finally, this project explains how departures from
the classical economy paradigm, i.e. asymmetric information and incomplete mar-
kets, create liquidity risk, how liquidity risk is endemic in the ￿nancial system and
9
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liquidity risk.
The current project is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the de￿nitions
and discusses the three types of liquidity and liquidity risk. Section 3 discusses
the linkages among the various liquidity types in normal periods and in turbulent
periods. Section 4 describes the current turmoil and evaluates the relevance of
the academic literature based on what was actually observed and Section 5 draws
implications for policy makers and brie￿ y concludes.
2 De￿nitions
In this section we identify and de￿ne three main types of liquidity pertaining to
the liquidity analysis of the ￿nancial system and their respective risks. The three
main types are central bank liquidity, market liquidity and funding liquidity. We
analyse the properties and empirical behaviour of each liquidity (risk) type. We
also present measures of liquidity risk and discuss the relation between liquidity and
liquidity risk.
2.1 Liquidity
The notion of liquidity in the economic literature relates to the ability of an economic
agent to exchange his or her existing wealth for goods and services or for other
assets2. In this de￿nition, two issues should be noted. First, liquidity can be
understood in terms of ￿ ows (as opposed to stocks), in other words, it is a ￿ ow
concept. In our framework, liquidity will refer to the unhindered ￿ ows among the
agents of the ￿nancial system, with a particular focus on the ￿ ows among the central
bank, commercial banks and markets. Second, liquidity refers to the ￿ability￿of
2This remark draws heavily from Williamson￿ s (2008) discussion of liquidity constraints. Ac-
cording to his discussion, such constraints ￿a⁄ect the ability of an economic agent to exchange his
or her existing wealth for goods and services or for other assets￿ .
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As will become obvious below, this ability can be hindered because of asymmetries
in information and the existence of incomplete markets.
2.1.1 Central bank liquidity
Central bank liquidity is the ability of the central bank to supply the the liquidity
needed to the ￿nancial system. It is typically measured as the liquidity supplied to
the economy by the central bank, i.e. the ￿ ow of monetary base3 from the central
bank to the ￿nancial system. It relates to ￿central bank operations liquidity￿ , which
refers to the amount of liquidity provided through the central bank auctions to the
money market according to the ￿monetary policy stance￿ . The latter re￿ ects the
prevailing value of the operational target, i.e. the control variable of the central
bank. In practice, the central bank strategy determines the monetary policy stance,
that is, decides on the level of the operational target (usually the key policy rate). In
order to implement this target, the central bank uses its monetary policy instruments
(conducts open market operations) to a⁄ect the liquidity in the money markets so
that the interbank rate is closely aligned to the operational target rate set by the
prevailing monetary policy stance.
More technically, central bank liquidity, a synonym for the supply of base money,
results from managing the central bank assets in its balance sheet, in accordance
to the monetary policy stance4. Consider the balance sheet of a central bank
(see Figure 2)5. In the liabilities side, the main components are the autonomous
factors and the reserves. The autonomous factors contain transactions which are
not controlled by the monetary policy function of the central bank6. The reserves
3The monetary base, otherwise known as base money or M-zero (M0) relates to the supply of
money in the economy and comprises the currency (banknotes) in circulation and banks￿reserves
with the central bank.
4See ECB (2004) and Bindseil (2005).
5The view of the balance sheet presented here is very simple. For a detailed analysis see
Bindseil (2004).
6In the euro system balance sheet the autonomous factor category contains banknotes in circu-
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order to meet settlement obligations from interbank transactions and to ful￿l reserve
requirements, i.e. the minimum balances that banks are required to hold with the
central bank7. The need for banknotes and the obligations of banks to ful￿l the
reserve requirements create an aggregate liquidity de￿cit in the system, thereby
making it reliant on re￿nancing from the central bank. The central bank, being the
monopoly provider of the monetary base, provides liquidity to the ￿nancial system
through its open market operations. Thus, these operations appear in the asset
side of the central bank￿ s balance sheet. The liquidity provided by the central bank
through its operations, i.e. its assets, should balance the liquidity de￿cit of the
system, i.e. its liabilities. Therefore, the central bank provides liquidity equal to
the sum of the autonomous factors8 plus the reserves. The central bank manages
its market operations so that the inter-bank short-term lending rates remain closely
aligned to the target policy rate9.
Figure 2: The balance sheet of the central bank
lation, government deposits, net foreign assets and ￿other net factors￿(see ECB, 2004).
7Usually, the amount of reserve requirements is close to the amount of total reserves. A
potential reason might be - among others- that excess reserve requirements are not remunerated.
8In practice the actual size of autonomous factors is not known and a forecast of them is used to
determine the liquidity allotment. See ECB (2004) for details on this issue and for the properties
of the autonomous factor forecasts.
9The short-term rates refer typically to the overnight rates, although in cases of some central
banks, it can also be weekly or even three month money market rates.
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liquidity and monetary or macroeconomic liquidity. The later refers to the growth
of money, credit and aggregate savings10. Therefore, it includes broad monetary
aggregates and in that sense includes central bank liquidity. Monetary liquidity is
important for monetary policy decision making, however, we focus on central bank
liquidity, because it is directly in￿ uenced by the central bank. It, thus, brings out
the role of the central bank in ￿nancial liquidity in a clearer manner, which, from a
policy making point of view, is more relevant.
2.1.2 Funding liquidity
The Basel Committee of Banking supervision de￿nes funding liquidity as the ability
of banks to meet their liabilities, unwind or settle their positions as they come due
(BIS, 2008)11. Similarly, the IMF provides a de￿nition of funding liquidity as the
ability of solvent institutions to make agreed upon payments in a timely fashion.
However, references to funding liquidity have also been made from the point of view
of traders (Brunnemeier and Pedersen, 2007) or investors (Strahan, 2008), where
funding liquidity relates to their ability to raise funding (capital or cash) in short
notice. All de￿nitions are compatible (see a relevant discussion in Drehmann and
Nikolaou, 2008). This can be clearly seen in practice, where funding liquidity,
being a ￿ ow concept, can be understood in terms of a budget constraint. Namely,
an entity is liquid as long as in￿ ows are bigger or at least equal to out￿ ows. This
can hold for ￿rms, banks, investors and traders. This paper mainly focuses on the
funding liquidity of banks, given their importance in distributing liquidity in the
￿nancial system.
It is therefore useful to consider the liquidity sources for banks. A ￿rst one is,
10See Ferguson et al. (2007) in Geneva Report on the World Economy for a de￿nition of macro-
economic liquidity. The Report presents a similar distinction of liquid types, namely macroeco-
nomic liquidity, funding liquidity and market liquidity (pp. 9 and 10). Moreover, it mentions that
these notions are inter-related and are important for ￿nancial stability.
11Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008), paragraph 1.
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is the market. A bank can always go to the asset market and sell its assets or
generate liquidity through securitisation, loan syndication and the secondary market
for loans, in its role as ￿originator and distributor￿ 12. Moreover, the bank can
get liquidity from the interbank market13, arguably the most important source of
liquidity. Finally, a bank can also choose to get funding liquidity directly from the
central bank. In the euro system, this is possible by bidding in the open market
operations of the ECB (see Drehmann and Nikolaou, 2008 for an extended analysis
of the sources and their importance). Knowledge of these sources is important in
order to better understand the liquidity linkages (described in Section 3).
2.1.3 Market liquidity
The notion of market liquidity has been around at least since Keynes (1930). It took
a long time, however, until a consensus de￿nition became available. A number of
recent studies de￿ne market liquidity as the ability to trade an asset at short notice,
at low cost and with little impact on its price. It therefore becomes obvious that
market liquidity should be judged on several grounds. The most obvious would be
the ability to trade. Moreover, Fernandez (1999) points out that ￿(market) liquidity,
as Keynes noted [...] incorporates key elements of volume, time and transaction
costs. Liquidity then may be de￿ned by three dimensions which incorporate these
elements: depth, breadth (or tightness) and resiliency￿ 14. These dimensions ensure
12In doing so, banks also create market liquidity, because they create a credit market with the
bank being the market maker (Strahan, 2008). This is an important insight, which helps to
understand the linkages between funding and market liquidity.
13The interbank market is the market where banks can trade with each other loans of very short
horizons (over-night) secured or unsecured.
14A market is deep, when a large number of transactions can occur without a⁄ecting the price,
or when a large amount of orders lies in the order-books of market-makers at a given time, i.e.
the number of available buyers and sellers is large. A tight market is a market where transaction
prices do not diverge from mid-market prices. Finally, in a resilient market price ￿ uctuations from
trades are quickly dissipated and imbalances in order ￿ ows are quickly adjusted. According to Liu
(2006), they can be summarised into four characteristics of liquidity: Trading quantity, trading
speed, trading cost and price impact.
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minimum loss of value and at competitive prices.
Academic interest has been broad regarding the properties of market liquidity
and its importance on the functioning of markets. An interesting ￿nding is the
remarkable commonalities in market liquidity. There is a positive covariance be-
tween individual stock liquidity and overall market liquidity. Moreover, Chordia
et al. (2000, 2005) have documented that liquidity is correlated across markets,
namely across stocks and across stocks and bonds (see papers for a relevant lit-
erature review). In fact, Brunnemeier and Pedersen (2005) provide a theoretical
framework which rationalises commonality of liquidity across assets and markets in
general through the microstructure analysis of the behaviour of traders. Moreover,
Stahel (2005) points to the existence of a global (market) liquidity factor. Finally,
the literature also records a negative (positive) relation between liquidity and asset
prices (returns) (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005).
For the purpose of this project we are going to focus on two types of market
liquidity. The liquidity in the interbank market, where liquidity is being traded
among banks and the liquidity in the asset market, where assets are being traded
among ￿nancial agents. These two types, as already seen, are the main sources
for a bank to acquire funding liquidity from the markets and therefore can help us
explain interactions between the various liquidity types.
2.2 Liquidity risk
Risk relates to the probability of having a realisation of a random variable di⁄erent
to the realisation preferred by the economic agent15. In our context the economic
agent would have a preference over liquidity. In that sense, the probability of not
being liquid would suggest that there is liquidity risk. The higher the probability,
15Machina and Rotschild (1987) suggest that the notion of risk is related to the probability dis-
tribution of the underlying random variable, where economic agents have well-de￿ned preferences
over the realizations of the random variable of interest.
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becomes a certainty) liquidity risk reaches a maximum and illiquidity materialises.
In that sense, there is a inverse relationship between (il)liquidity and liquidity risk,
given that the higher the liquidity risk, the higher the probability of becoming
illiquid, and therefore, the lower the liquidity.
2.2.1 Central bank liquidity risk
A de￿nition for central bank liquidity risk was, to the best of our knowledge, not
possible to come up with in the literature. This is mainly because of the widespread
view that central bank liquidity risk is non-existent, as the central bank is always
able to supply base money and, therefore, can never be illiquid. Typically the
central bank, being the monopoly provider of liquidity, i.e. the originator of the
monetary base, can dispense liquidity as and when it deems needed, so as to satisfy
the equilibrium demand for liquidity in the banking system (avoiding cases of excess
liquidity or liquidity de￿cits) according to its policy stance. A central bank can
only be illiquid to the extent that there is no demand for domestic currency, and
therefore the supply of base money from the central bank could not materialise.
This could happen in cases of hyperin￿ ation or an exchange rate crisis. However,
based on conventional wisdom such a scenario could be safely regarded as unlikely,
at least in developed, industrialised countries and, therefore, it is not considered in
the literature.
It would also be useful to stress that a central bank can incur costs in its role as
a liquidity provider, but these costs do not necessarily re￿ ect liquidity risk. Such
costs can involve central bank speci￿c risks (e.g. counterparty credit risk related
to collateral value), monetary policy related risks (e.g. risks of wrong signalling)
or wider risks to ￿nancial stability (i.e. the moral hazard issue that relates to
emergency liquidity assistance in turbulent periods). Nevertheless, these risks do
not a⁄ect the ability of the central bank to provide liquidity.
16
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At least since Bagehot (1873) it was known that banks are subject to funding liquid-
ity risk. According to the IMF (2008) funding liquidity risk captures the inability
of a ￿nancial intermediary to service their liabilities as they fall due. Other de￿ni-
tions of funding liquidity risk usually involve a time horizon, that is, the probability
of becoming illiquid is typically measured for a given period ahead and can di⁄er
signi￿cantly according to the length of the period (Matz and Neu, 2006; Drehmann
and Nikolaou, 2008). Typically, funding liquidity risk depends on the availability
of the four liquidity sources, as described in Section 2.1.2, and the ability to satisfy
the budget constraint over the respective period of time.
Measuring funding liquidity risk is not trivial. In most cases practitioners con-
struct various funding liquidity ratios, which reveal di⁄erent aspects of the avail-
ability of funds within a certain time horizon ahead and use them as proxies for
funding liquidity risk16. Such measures can be produced either by static balance
sheet analysis or by dynamic stress testing techniques and scenario analysis. The
latter is more cumbersome to calculate if only because it relies on complicated cal-
culations and a wider set of information and hypotheses17. Recently, Drehmann
and Nikolaou (2008) suggest a simple and more straightforward proxy, based on the
role of the central bank as a potential funding liquidity source. They argue that
bidding behaviour in central bank auctions can reveal the funding liquidity risk of
banks over a one week horizon and construct proxies of funding liquidity risk from
bidding data.
16Matz and Neu (2006) and Banks (2005) provide a list of funding ratios and liquidity ratios that
are frequently used at a ￿rm level as liquidity risk proxies (for example the funding ratio, which is
the ratio of total available funding over the total available assets above a number of periods).
17Static balance-sheet analysis provides a simple, ￿point in time￿liquidity index, which is based
on a static and often backward looking impression of the liquidity condition. It does not contain any
information about the horizon within which positions can be liquidated or become due (see Banks,
2005). The dynamic analysis is essentially based on a more detailed break down of in￿ ows and
out￿ ows. In this type of analysis the respective paths of in- and out￿ ows of assets and liabilities are
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and Nikolaou (2008) ￿nd that funding liquidity risk bears similarities to market
liquidity risk, in the sense that it is low and stable most of the times, but subject
to occasional spikes (e.g. funding liquidity risk appears elevated during the current
turmoil period). This ￿nding is supported by Matz and Neu, (2006), who view
liquidity risk as a consequential risk, because it increases following one or more
spikes in other ￿nancial risks (i.e. market liquidity risk). Brunnemeier and Pedersen
(2007) provide further theoretical support, and rationalise linkages between market
and funding liquidity risk (for traders), which are validated empirically by Drehmann
and Nikolaou (2008).
2.2.3 Market liquidity risk
Market liquidity risk relates to the inability of trading at a fair price with immediacy.
It is the systematic, non-diversi￿able component of liquidity risk. This has two
important implications. First, it suggests commonalities in liquidity risk across
markets. Such commonalities have been grounded theoretically (Brunnemeier and
Pedersen, 2005 and 2007) and recorded empirically across stocks and across bonds
and equity markets (Chordia et al., 2005 - see discussion in Section 2.1.3). More
extensive propagation mechanisms can also transfer liquidity risk across interbank
and asset markets (see discussion in Section 3.2).
The second implication of systemic risk is that it should be priced. Namely,
market liquidity risk has been typically regarded as a cost or premium in the asset
pricing literature, which a⁄ects the price of an asset in a positive way18 (Bangia et
al., 1999; Holmstr￿ om and Tirole, 2001; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and
Pedersen, 2005; Chordia et al., 2005) thereby in￿ uencing market decisions (i.e. opti-
mal portfolio allocation as in Longstaf, 1998) and market practices (i.e. transaction
costs as in Jarrow and Subramanian, 1997). The larger the premium, the higher
18In fact, the relationship between liquidity risk and prices can be endogenous, in the sense that
there is a two-way causality (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005).
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pricing model of Holmstr￿ om and Tirole (2001), asset pricing models typically mea-
sure liquidity risk as the covariance (commonality) between a measure of liquidity
(innovations) and market returns (Pastor and Staumbaugh, 2003; Acharya and Ped-
ersen, 2005; Liu, 2006). Liquidity risk commoves with contemporaneous returns,
but it is also possible to predict future returns based on current liquidity risk esti-
mates (Chordia et al., 2001; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Liu, 2006). Overall, the
related literature suggests that asset prices re￿ ect liquidity costs, which are linked
to the existence of liquidity risk.
The behaviour of market liquidity risk (i.e. of the market liquidity premium)
has also been recorded. Liquidity risk is in most cases low and stable. Elevated
liquidity risk is rare and episodic (see empirical evidence in equity market in Pastor
and Staumbaugh, 2003). The episodic nature can result from downward liquidity
spirals due to mutually reinforcing funding and market illiquidity (Brunnemeier
and Pedersen, 2005 and 2007) and is rare because of bene￿ts from cooperation
in trading (Carlin et al., 2007). On this latter point, Brusco and Castiglinesi
(2007) further argue that ￿nancial links are established only when the bene￿ts are
greater than the costs, that is, when the possibility of a ￿nancial crisis (and therefore
elevated liquidity risk) is limited. As a consequence, crises and ￿nancial contagion
are rare events. Given this behaviour of market liquidity risk, it is possible to
understand why liquidity is time varying and persistent in smooth periods (Amihud,
2002; Chordia et al., 2000,2001,2002; Pastor and Staumbaugh, 2003).
Finally, the implications of market (systemic) liquidity risk are important from a
￿nancial stability point of view. In fact, individual liquidity risk (leading to single or
few bank failures) might not be of consequence, and indeed might even be a helpful
mechanism to restore ￿nancial health in certain parts of the system (Diamond and
Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 1998). However, systemic (market) liquidity risk
can have serious repercussions for the ￿nancial system as a whole. Notably, it
19
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of resources and ultimately, a⁄ect the real economy (Hoggarth and Saporta, 2001;
Ferguson et al., 2007). Given the importance of market liquidity risk (i.e. systemic
risk) to ￿nancial stability, it is the type of liquidity risk that immediately alerts
policy makers. Nevertheless, given the intense linkages among the various liquidity
types, a general view of the liquidity ￿ ows in the system is also needed to examine
market liquidity risk.
3 Liquidity linkages
In this section we argue that the three distinct types of liquidity are intensively
interconnected. To validate this claim, we analyse linkages among them based on
two alternative scenarios. The ￿rst is under normal periods and the second under
turbulent periods. Normal periods refer to periods of low liquidity risk. In such
periods the system a virtuous circle would be established between the three liquidity
types, fostering stability of the system. The turbulent periods would refer to periods
of high liquidity risk. In such periods the linkages between the three liquidity types
would remain strong, however, they would prompt a vicious circle among the three
liquidity types which could ultimately destabilise the ￿nancial system. We describe
the liquidity linkages under these two scenarios in an attempt to analyse the causes
of liquidity risk, bring forward the mechanisms and transmission channels among
the di⁄erent liquidity types and discuss the role of central bank liquidity in such
situations.
3.1 Liquidity linkages in normal times
In normal periods liquidity ￿ ows easily among the three liquidity types, establishing
a virtuous liquidity circle that stimulates stability in the ￿nancial system. The
central bank, who has the responsibility to supply aggregate liquidity (Friedman and
20
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system. This would cover the liquidity de￿cit of the ￿nancial system on aggregate.
This amount of liquidity would be received by the banks and, through the various
markets (interbank20 and asset markets) it would be re-distributed to the liquidity
needing agents of the ￿nancial system and recycled within the system. Each agent
who is liquidity constrained would ask for the amount of liquidity that would satisfy
her funding liquidity needs. After this (aggregate) re-distribution, the central bank
would observe the new demand for liquidity and supply it, so that a similar liquidity
circle start again (see ECB, 2004). In that sense, each liquidity type performs a very
speci￿c role. The central bank would provide the ￿neutral￿amount of liquidity,
markets would ensure its re-distribution and recycling and funding needs its e¢ cient
allocation among the agents (See Figure 3).
Figure 3: The role of the di⁄erent liquidity types
From this simple outline it becomes obvious that each liquidity type depends on
the other two types (see Figure 4). This is because, the role of each liquidity type
is unique in the ￿nancial system, therefore each liquidity type should perform its
19The neutral or equilibrium demand for liquidity is the amount of liquidity that would satisfy
the liquidity demand of the ￿nancial system, to the extent that the interbank rates are in line with
the policy rates.
20Note that not all banks are eligible to take part in open market operations or are successful
in their bidding behaviour. Therefore, the interbank market is responsible for redistributing the
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liquid. Namely, the ￿neutral￿amount of liquidity provided by the central bank
should ￿ ow unencumbered among the agents as long as market liquidity e⁄ectively
recycles it and funding liquidity allocates it within the system in an e¢ cient and
e⁄ective way. Markets should be liquid provided that there is enough liquidity
in the ￿nancial system on aggregate (i.e. there are no liquidity de￿cits) and each
counterparty demands liquidity according to their funding needs. Finally, funding
liquidity depends on the availability of the funding liquidity sources. For example,
in this scenario, a bank would always be liquid as long as it an get enough liquidity
to satisfy its funding needs from the markets21 or the central bank.
Figure 4: The three liquidity nodes of the ￿nancial system
This base-line scenario could generate a virtuous circle in the economy (see Figure
4) and foster ￿nancial stability. The system overall would be liquid, because there
would be enough liquidity in the system on aggregate. This liquidity would be
e⁄ectively distributed to the agents they need it most, according to their funding
liquidity needs. Overall, liquidity would ￿ ow easily and unobstructed in the system
21Funding liquidity sources, as seen in Section 2.1.2 include both the central bank and the market.
A bank can get liquidity directly from the central bank, or through the markets. The interbank
market can be one option, but asset markets can further generate (funding and market) liquidity
through assets sales (part of which might be related to banks￿securitised assets).
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markets are e¢ cient, the choice of alternative liquidity providers will only be based
on price considerations (Ayuso and Repullo, 2003; Ewerhart et al., 2007; Drehmann
and Nikolaou, 2008), i.e. they will be able to choose the most cost-e¢ cient funding
option. Under these circumstances, there will always be enough liquidity so as
to smooth out any frictions22. That would suggest minimal systemic risks in the
￿nancial system and much reduced possibility of ￿nancial crisis, therefore robust
￿nancial stability.
3.2 Liquidity linkages in turbulent times
As liquidity risk creeps into the system, the links described above can be distorted
and in fact produce a vicious illiquidity spiral in the ￿nancial system. In what
follows we are going to focus on two main issues. First, discuss the origins of
liquidity risk in the ￿nancial system, so as to show that liquidity risk is in fact
endogenous to the system. This implies the possibility of reverting from a virtuous
to a vicious circle in the economy. Second, we are going to analyse how this vicious
circle might work and what measures could be taken to halt it and restore the virtous
one.
More speci￿cally, we show that the cause of liquidity risk lies in coordination
failures among depositors, banks or traders, which ultimately feed and are being
fed by asymmetric information and incomplete markets. We also explain how
interactions between the three main liquidity types (funding, market and central
bank liquidity) can be a⁄ected by liquidity risk. Notably, the strong linkages remain,
but in turbulent times they rather serve as risk propagation channels and destabilise
the ￿nancial system. Central bank liquidity policies can halt it temporarily, but
22In fact, in the extreme case of no liquidity risk, banks will have no reason to plan their
liquidity (or for that matter to engage in liquidity management to avoid bad surprises in their
liquidity position): they can just return to the capital market as needs arise (Tirole, 2008). In
essence, liquidity management will not matter as banks or markets will never be illiquid.
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could ￿ght the source of liquidity risk and restore the virtous circle. In our analysis
we pick an arbitrary starting point, e.g. a situation of elevated funding liquidity
risk in a bank and discuss how it can spread through market liquidity risk and what
is the role of central bank liquidity in such cases (see Figure 5). In so doing, we
stress the existence of asymmetric information and incomplete markets as sources
of liquidity risk. We choose to depict such a situation also due to the resemblance
it bears to the current turmoil period.
3.2.1 From (bank) funding liquidity risk
Figure 5: Funding liquidity risk
Funding liquidity risk lies in the heart of banking. Banks are considered by con-
struction fragile due to the maturity transformations they undertake (liquid short-
term deposits to illiquid long-term loans). More speci￿cally, the main role of banks
in the ￿nancial system is to provide liquidity through intermediation. Banks inter-
mediate between depositors and investors and provide illiquid loans to the latter,
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transform short maturities (deposits) into longer maturities (investments) in order
to create funding liquidity for investors (Strahan, 2008) and to promote the e¢ cient
allocation of resources in the system26. This leaves the banks exposed to an in-
herent maturity mismatch. This mismatch can cause instability in the bank in its
role as provider of liquidity upon demand to depositors (through deposit transac-
tions), or borrowers (through committed lines of credit). Holding enough liquid
assets at any point would minimise their exposure to risk, but this is not optimal for
them because these assets are yielding low returns. Banks, therefore face a trade
o⁄ between holding (short-term) low-yield liquid assets and using them to invest in
(long-term) high-yield illiquid assets27 (Strahan, 2008).
This fragile construction of banks subjects them to funding liquidity risk. Given
23A number of papers investigate the role of banks as liquidity providers and more speci￿cally
why banks have a comparative advantage over other ￿nancial institutions to provide both deposit
taking and lending. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2002) put forth the idea of important synergies
between deposit taking and lending, which allow banks to provide liquidity in the most cost-
e¢ cient manner. That is, under particular conditions, the coexistence of these two functions
creates an economy of scale that conserves on the amount of costly liquid assets that are needed to
support loan commitments. The synergy exists as long as deposit withdrawals are not too highly
correlated with commitment take-downs. Gatev and Strahan (2006) and Gatev et al. (2006)
provide empirical evidence of negative covariance, which enables them to further suggest that
deposits can be viewed as a natural hedges against systematic liquidity risk exposures stemming
from issuing loan commitments and lines of credit. This mechanism is possible given the liability
guarantees (i.e. deposit insurance, central bank liquidity and targeted liquidity assistance) of the
banking system. For example, Pennachi (2006) shows that before the introduction of deposit
insurance, such synergies did not appear to be in place.
24The traditional banking environment of asset transformation through ￿originate and hold￿ ,
would suggest that banks hold the illiquid loans provided in their balance sheets. In the new
banking environment, of ￿originate and distribute￿ , banks transform illiquid loans into more liquid
assets through securitisation, loan syndication and the secondary market for loans. (See Strahan
(2008) and ECB (2008) for a discussion on securitisation).
25Banks rely on the presence of asymmetric information between depositors and investors and
rationalise their role via their ability to monitor investors better (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983).
Their superior information on loans granted can only partly safeguard them from funding liquidity
risk.
26A similar logic can stimulate a liquidity creation mechanism between market makers or traders
and ￿nancial market investors.
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coordination failures between agents (depositors) demanding liquidity from the bank,
resulting to bank runs, the extreme form of funding liquidity risk28. Typically a
bank run is modelled as a situation (possible equilibrium) where depositors decide
to liquidate their deposits before the maturity of the investment, leading to in-
creased demand for liquidity that the bank cannot satisfy (see e.g. the seminal work
on bank runs of Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). This can materialise if depositors
believe that other depositors will run. In that case, even a perfectly sound and
solvent bank, can fail. According to Diamond and Dybvig (1983, 2000), the rea-
son propelling such coordination failures is bad expectations leading to self-ful￿lling
prophecies (sunspot equilibria or exogenously determined). Alternatively it may
relate to fundamental worries, i.e. rational concerns, which may be linked to depar-
tures from the classical economic paradigm. Namely, imperfect information may
lead to bank runs. As argued by Morris and Shin (1999) if the soundness of the
borrower is uncertain, runs may occur when a commonly observed signal about the
borrower increases uncertainty among depositors, because it is optimal to pre-empt
withdrawals of others by borrowing ￿rst. On the other hand, bank runs may result
from incomplete markets, as aggregate risk cannot be hedged away (Allen and Gale,
1998)29. Such concerns are empirically more likely to motivate demand shocks by
depositors than self-ful￿lling prophesies according to Gorton, (1988)30. Overall,
28However, note that bank runs may not always be costly as was originally suggested by Diamond
and Dybvig (1983). For example, Allen and Gale (1998) investigate cases where allowing for bank
runs can achieve an optimal allocation of resources in the economy.
29In a relevant model by Allen and Gale (1998) bank runs are a result of a natural out-growth of
the business cycle (elevated aggregate risk). The impact of the business cycle on the bank￿ s assets
is captured by uncertainty about asset returns. An economic downturn will reduce the value of
bank assets, raising the possibility that banks are unable to meet their commitments. Concerns
about the solvency of the bank increase and, because markets are incomplete and therefore agents
are not able to hedge against such downturns, funding liquidity risk is raised (see Allen and Gale
(1998) for a formal exposition and a related literature review).
30A combination of panic and fundamental views of crises that generates runs is also described
by Rochet and Vives (2004) in a theoretical model that links the probability of occurrence of a
crisis to the fundamentals.
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classical economy31.
3.2.2 To market liquidity risk
Funding liquidity risk in a single bank (i.e. individual liquidity risk) is per se not
a cause of concern for policy makers. The problem arises when funding liquidity
risk is transmitted to more than one bank, i:e. when liquidity risk becomes systemic
(market liquidity risk). In what follows we are going to see how individual funding
liquidity risk can propagate to other banks and generate liquidity risk to the inter-
bank and the asset market. We ￿rst explore the transmission channel from funding
to market liquidity (see Figure 6).
Figure 6: The link from funding liquidity (risk) to market liquidity
(risk)
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is directly linked to interbank market liquidity risk. As Diamond and Rajan (2001,
2005) explain, banks are linked by a common market for liquidity. Individual bank
failures can potentially shrink the common pool of liquidity which links all banks
together and therefore propagate the liquidity shortage to other banks through ex-
cessive early restructuring, causing a contagion of failures until a complete meltdown
of the system. Such propagation mechanisms can work through the extensive in-
terlinkages among banks. The latter relate to the highly inter-connected bank
payment systems (see Flannery, 1996 and Freixas et al., 1999 for further references),
to balance sheet linkages (see Cifuentes et al., 2005 and references therein) or, more
generally, cross-holdings of liabilities across banks (be it deposits, interbank loans
and credit exposures, or committed credit lines). Moreover, they can take the form
of informational spillovers to the interbank market, leading to generalised bank
runs32. In this setting, individual illiquidity can lead to market illiquidity.
Such interlinkages can become crisis propagation channels in the presence of
incomplete markets and asymmetric information. This is because in the face of
such interlinkages the absence of a complete set of contingent securities (i.e. it is not
possible to hedge against future liquidity outcomes) may combine with information
asymmetries about the solvency of the banks (i.e. it is not possible distinguish
whether a bank is illiquid or insolvent) and stimulate fears of counterparty credit
risk (Allen and Gale, 2000; Drehmann et al., 2007; Brusco and Castiglinesi, 2007
and Strahan, 2008). Against this background, moral hazard may arise as insolvent
banks may act as merely illiquid banks and decide to free-ride on the common pool
of liquidity in the interbank market. These banks can then engage in risk prone
behaviour by under-investing in liquid assets (Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987) and
gambling for resurrection (Freixas et al., 2004). Ultimately, this can lead to adverse
32Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont (2000) show that, if banks are linked by the interbank market
and aggregate liquidity shocks are sequentially correlated, a run on a single bank serves as a signal
for depositors of other banks to withdraw, triggering the collapse of the entire banking system.
28
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1008
February 2009selection in lending, i.e. a situation where insolvent banks (mistaken for simply
illiquid banks) will be granted liquidity, whereas solvent but illiquid banks will not.
Adverse selection in lending can translate into limited commitment of future cash
￿ ows (as in Hart and Moore, 1994, and Diamond and Rajan, 2001) and uncertainty
about future lending due to counterparty credit risk (Flannery, 1996). It may also
take the form of liquidity hoarding, because of concerns about counterparty solvency
(e.g. Rochet and Vives, 2004), or doubts about their own ability to borrow in the
future (Freixas et al., 2004; Holmstr￿ om and Tirole, 2001). Overall, some banks are
rationed out of the system. The few remaining surplus banks may take advantage
of their oligopoly power and strategically under-provide lending in order to exploit
the others￿failure (Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer, 2007) thereby aggravating
the illiquidity in the interbank market, or short-squeeze the liquidity-thirsty banks,
thereby increasing the cost of obtaining liquidity (Nyborg and Strebulaev, 2004).
Asset markets: Asset markets can be another propagation channel from
funding liquidity risk to market liquidity risk. With the interbank market liquidity-
providing channel severely impaired, liquidity risk might immigrate to the asset
markets as banks may seek liquidity through ￿re-sales, which will impact on asset
prices and asset market liquidity. The propagation runs through the asset side of
banks￿balance sheets, given that banks will need to restructure their portfolios and
therefore will need to ￿nd buyers for their distressed assets in order to avoid costly
project liquidation (Rochet and Vives, 2004). In an environment of incomplete
markets, the supply of and demand for liquidity are likely to be inelastic in the
short-run and ￿nancial markets may only have limited capacity to absorb assets
sales (Allen and Gale, 2004, 2005; Gorton and Huang, 2002). This can result to
increased volatility of asset prices (Allen and Gale, 2005), a reduction in market
participation due to increased uncertainty (Easly and O￿ Hara, 2007), and distressed
pricing, where the market for assets clears only at ￿re-sale prices as asset prices fall
below their fundamental value in certain states (Allen and Gale, 1998).
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Up to know, we investigated the transmission channels from funding to market liq-
uidity. However, it is easy to see that second round e⁄ects help create a loop
between market and funding liquidity (from market liquidity back to funding liquid-
ity and back again), leading to downward liquidity spirals (see Figure 7). In that
sense, the ￿nal outcome can far outweight in magnitude the original shock.
Figure 7: The interaction between funding and market liquidity (risk)
Second round e⁄ects: The strong linkages between market and funding liq-
uidity can cause second round e⁄ects, which may deepen market illiquidity. This
can happen in a ￿nancial system where assets and balance sheets are marked-to-
market and subject to regulations. Asset price changes show up immediately in
changes in net worth of the balance sheets and elicit responses from ￿nancial in-
termediaries who adjust the size of their balance sheets according to their leverage
targets, thereby e⁄ectuating a speedy transmission of the feedback e⁄ect (Adrian
and Shin, 2007). In the new prices, externally imposed solvency constraints, the in-
ternally imposed risk controls or regulatory considerations such as capital adequacy
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al., 2005). Distressed pricing can become worse due to further frictions in trading,
borne by trading regulations, limits to arbitrage and predatory trading renewing the
circle and causing downward spirals in asset prices34. In this way, the combination
of mark-to-market accounting and regulatory constraints has the potential to induce
an endogenous response that far outweighs the initial shock. The loss and resulting
funding liquidity risk in the single bank can be transmitted to its creditors, thereby
leading to interbank liquidity risk, which could urge a new round of asset sales (Ci-
fuentes et al., 2005) and further distress pricing. In that sense, the interaction
between funding and market liquidity can lead to a dangerous downward liquidity
spiral in the markets.
Furthermore, the new business model of credit, through an increase in securiti-
sation, has strengthened linkages between market and funding liquidity, leading to
more direct contagion channels and faster transmission of second round e⁄ects from
asset markets to funding liquidity and vice-versa. The e⁄ects of securitisation can
be twofold. On the one hand, it is an important source of funding for the bank
and a broadly used tool to manage its funding liquidity risk (by transferring credit
risk o⁄ its balance sheet). Moreover, it helps to complete markets, by creating a
larger and more disperse pool of assets, which satisfy various risk appetites. On
the other hand, it has reduced the fundamental role of liquidity transformation tra-
ditionally performed by banks. In the current design, banks originate assets and
33Bank capital regulation, especially when it is risk-based, has the drawback that requirements
bite in recessions, when bank lending may need to be encouraged and tend to be slack in economic
upturns when bank lending may need to be reined in.
34The relevant literature has recorded breakdowns in arbitrage when most needed (Schleifer and
Vischny, 1997), while a breakdown in cooperation between traders can lead to predatory trading
practices which aggravate illiquidity conditions in the short run (Brunnemeyer and Pedersen, 2005;
Carlin, Lobo and Viswanathan, 2007). Such situations prevent prices from adjusting to their
fundamental value. The uncertainty over the causes of deviations from fundamentals can unease
traders who will react with raising margins. In so doing, initial liquidity shocks can be ampli￿ed
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expertise on such things as pricing models, while becoming increasingly dependent
to market institutional factors, such as credit rating agencies. Therefore, securiti-
sation has made banks more dependent on market funding, market structures and
workings. Notably, the banks￿incentives and ability to lend are expected to depend
on ￿nancial market conditions to a larger extent than in the past, when banks were
overwhelmingly funded via bank deposits. The connection between funding liquid-
ity (risk) and market liquidity (risk) is, therefore, tighter under this new design and
risks are transferred in a more direct way (see ECB, 2008a; Ferguson et al., (2007)
and Brunnemeier (2008) for an in depth analysis on the e⁄ects of securitisation).
This makes the link between funding and market liquidity more tenuous and can
therefore ease the evolution of downward liquidity spirals.
3.2.4 The role of the central bank
Up to now we have discussed that funding liquidity risk is endogenous in the banking
system and that under incomplete markets and asymmetric information a vicious
circle can be created between funding and market liquidity, potentially leading to
systemic failures within the ￿nancial system. Such coordination failures and con-
tagion e⁄ects have been shown to be potentially costly (Aharony and Swary, 1983;
Herring and Vankudre, 1987; Saunders, 1987), lending support to the usefulness of
supporting ailing institutions. The central bank should be in a position to tackle
systemic liquidity risks in its role of guarantor of the entire economy (and not only
for parts of the banking system) and in its capacity as the originator of the mon-
etary base (see Section II). It is therefore charged with preventing panic-induced
collapses of a banking system and minimising the costs of bank runs and forced
liquidations through its interventions (for a discussion on the traditional role of a
central bank see Thornton, 1802; Bagehot, 1873; and Humphrey and Keleher, 1984
in Goodhart and Illing, 2002). The role of the central bank is unique due to its
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because it is the only agent interested in maintaining aggregate welfare, having in
its disposal the mechanisms to enable market stabilisation. These mechanisms are
liquidity provision mechanisms, including emergency liquidity provision (i.e. acting
as a Lender of Last Resort -LLR), complementary to which, they can also mobilise
their supervisory and regulatory role. Overall, there is no doubt that the central
bank has the ability and the right to provide emergency liquidity assistance (LLR).
However, there are certain limitations to central bank interventions, which make
them an inadequate tool per se to tackle ￿nancial crises. To begin with, their role
focuses on shock-absorbtion and not on shock-prevention. In other words, a central
bank does not prevent all shocks to the ￿nancial system, but rather minimises the
secondary repercussions of these shocks (avert contagion, spillover or domino e⁄ects).
Moreover, it can be seen only as a short-run stabilisation function (see relevant
discussion in Humphrey and Keleher, 1984)35. In terms of our simple illustration
of liquidity linkages, this would suggest that central bank interventions can provide
temporary injections of liquidity which would aim to break the loop between market
and funding liquidity risk, so that downward liquidity spirals would fail to further
distress markets (see Figure 7)36.
The scope and the merits of emergency central bank liquidity assistance become
murkier when one considers the conditions under which the bank should lend in
35Humphrey and Keleher (1984) review the role of central bank emergency liquidity aid. They
view the role of the Lender of Last resort (LLR) as mainly to promote monetary stability, i.e.
prevent credit/debt contraction from producing monetary contraction. They support the line of
reasoning of Thorton and Bagehot, who suggested a policy of lending freely to the markets. It
should be noted that this was equivalent to ￿unsterilised￿interventions, which inevitably increased
the amount of money in the economy. They therefore note that the LLR function can only act as
a short-run stabilisation function which need not necessarily con￿ ict with longer-run central bank
objectives. In other words, the LLR actions should stop any crisis within a short period of time,
before the supply of high powered money (central bank liquidity) strays far of its stable long-run
path.
36Looking at Figure 6, this would suggest that central bank interventions aim to insulate the
e⁄ects of liquidity risks within each node (funding liquidity and market liquidity) and break the
link between the two nodes.
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back to the argument of Bagehot (1873) who expressed the fundamental, classical
view on this issue. He argues that the central bank should be known to be ready
to lend without limits to any solvent bank against good collateral and in
penalty rates, so that banks do not use them to fund their current operations.
However, a lot of research and experience have been accumulated since Bagehot
and the points in his principle have been questioned and re-visited. A naive one-
rule-￿ts-all intervention policy is no longer considered, rather, intervention policies
appear in practice to be tailor-made. The Appendix of this project attempts to
shortly review the debate on the Bagehot principle, address a few more relevant
issues (such as the role of monetary policy and the issue of lending to the markets
versus lending to individual institutions) and discuss the dilemma faced by policy
makers with respect to intervention policies.
The crux of the problem faced in central bank interventions lies on information
asymmetries that hamper the distinction between illiquid and insolvent banks. More
speci￿cally, the inability to distinguish between illiquid and insolvent borrowers
can create bidirectional links from central bank liquidity to funding and to market
liquidity, and also hurt the central bank itself. The link to funding liquidity is
direct. By rescuing undeserving institutions (i.e. insolvent institutions) the central
is implicitly penalising solvent but illiquid banks mainly because it increases their
costs of funding. This could render them unable to borrow or to repay the loan,
thereby enhancing their funding liquidity risk (For more information see Flannery
(1996) and the argument of Goodfriend and King (1989) on ￿Should a central
bank lend only to solvent banks?￿ in the Appendix). The link to market
liquidity risk is also direct if we consider that the central bank provision can be
seen as an insurance or safety net for institutions. A mis-allocation of central
bank liquidity can promote excessive risk taking by banks and create moral hazard,
as it would stimulate risk-prone behaviour by insolvent banks and the tendency
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current and stir future liquidity crises (through the adverse selection mechanism
in lending already discussed in Section 3.2.3). Finally, lending to undeserving
institutions could ultimately turn against the central bank￿ s own stabilising role.
This happens because the recovery of the ￿nancial system could be more uncertain,
lengthy and costly and the central bank would be faced with increased costs of
maintaining the ￿nancial safety-net. In a more practical level, liberal central bank
liquidity intervention policies can increase credit risk in the central bank￿ s portfolio
(depending on the collateral that it accepts), and increase the risk of compromising
its monetary policy objectives.
Figure 8: Liquidity (risk) linkages within the ￿nancial system
Overall, the role of central bank liquidity in situations of high liquidity risk is
tedious. The central bank is not in a position to address the causes of liquidity
risk, rather its function is itself hampered by incomplete information. In that sense,
the role of central bank liquidity in cases of crises is not structural, rather it is a
temporary support to the ￿nancial system, until the structural causes of liquidity
risk can be dealt with. In essence central bank liquidity in turbulent times attempts
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liquidity injections to the system. This aid can be o⁄ered swiftly and promptly,
until other more time-demanding tools (namely supervision and regulation) can
be allowed the necessary time to focus against the causes of risk. This aid can
be important, but it de￿nitely is not a panacea. In fact, it is does not even o⁄er
guaranteed success, because the causes of liquidity risk can hurt the stabilising role of
central bank liquidity and in fact produce the opposite e⁄ects, as already discussed.
In this case, not only the vicious link between funding and market liquidity risk is
not broken, but a full vicious circle is established in the ￿nancial system, that feeds
from central bank liquidity (Figure 8).
3.2.5 The role of supervision and regulation
In turbulent times the role of supervision and regulation can be very important.
E⁄ective supervision (be it in the form of interbank peer-monitoring strategies37
or o¢ cial, centralised supervision) can balance information asymmetries because
it facilitates the distinction between illiquid and insolvent banks (Freixas et al.,
2004). Moreover, in the presence of e⁄ective regulation, the implementation of
supervision can be safeguarded and supported and its e⁄ectiveness fostered (see for
example Rochet and Tirole, 1996)38. In addition, e¢ cient supervision and e⁄ective
regulation can help the development of new ￿nancial products which would enlarge
the pool of assets for various risk appetites and help to complete markets. In that
sense, supervision and regulation can directly act against the causes of liquidity
37Peer monitoring among banks is considered important because of the large and unsecured na-
ture of the inter-bank loans. Also, inter-bank lending relationships are perceived to help overcome
agency problems. Failure of e⁄ective peer monitoring induces moral hazard and can lead to sys-
tematic illiquidity. Several papers in the literature focus on the role of peer monitoring in interbank
markets (see Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Freixas and Holthausen (2005) for theoretical models
based on this assumption, and Fur￿ne (2001) for empirical analysis in support of the assumption).
38Rochet and Tirole (1996) show that the e⁄ective implementation of peer monitoring among
banks may be di¢ cult, due to commitment problems by governments. Liquidity requirements
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With e¢ cient supervision and e⁄ective regulation in the picture, the role of cen-
tral bank liquidity can be recast in their shadow. Namely, central bank liquidity
can act as a ￿rst bu⁄er against the problems caused by liquidity risk and try to cope
with breaking or halting the vicious circle between funding and market liquidity. In
the mean time, supervision and regulation would tackle the sources of liquidity risk,
namely asymmetric information and incomplete markets in order to both, quench
the current crisis and also minimise the possibility of having future ones. To the
extent that liquidity risk is endogenous in the ￿nancial system both the scope and
the e¢ ciency of central bank liquidity will always depend on the quality of supervi-
sion and regulation in the system. In the best case scenario, where supervision and
regulation would minimise information asymmetries and enhance market complete-
ness, the turbulent scenario described in this section would be avoided and the role
of central bank liquidity intervention would be redundant.
Nevertheless, the implementation of e¢ cient supervision and e⁄ective regulation
is not a trivial issue. Among other reasons, this is because gathering information
for supervision and establishing, implementing and monitoring regulation can be
very costly. Market discipline can be imposed uno¢ cially by peer monitoring of
agents, as in the case of Goodfriend and King (1989), who suggest that deregulated
markets can, through their ￿nancial instruments and practices successfully discipline
themselves in order to provide well-functioning markets. In such cases, the central
39Note that ine⁄ective regulation can lead to distorted outcomes. For example, it can increase
systemic liquidity risk (as it can happen with the deposit insurance scheme, which can potentially
encourage risky investments by banks). For example Pennachi (2006) argues that while a gov-
ernment deposit guarantee may produce risk-sharing bene￿ts, the current methods for pricing this
guarantee and for regulating banks are leading to new forms of moral hazard that kill o⁄ e¢ cient
private ￿nancial innovations. Moral hazard is created because insurance mis-pricing and capital
regulations have the e⁄ect of subsidizing systematic risks. Moreover, regulation could cause prob-
lems when it becomes binding in turbulent periods where more lenience is needed (Cifuentes et al.,
2005). Finally, the current market turmoil also reveals the frailty of certain regulatory measures,
such as relying too much on market structures (i.e. rating agencies) for pricing instruments and
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system developed. Rochet and Tirole (1996) have argued in favor of collateralising
inter-bank lending and increasing the responsibility of banks, through insurance
and transferring costs of failure to the originating banks (see also Goodhart, 2008).
However, in cases where central bank intervention is deemed necessary (i.e. in
cases of failures in the interbank markets) Rochet and Tirole (1996) are in favor of
centralising liquidity management via the central bank. Other authors propose the
establishment of o¢ cial regulation and supervision, centralised in the hands of the
central bank. This centralisation would promote better transparency and create
economies of scale in acquiring information, which would lower the cost of monitoring
banks, make it easier to distinguish illiquid from insolvent agents and therefore
reduce the costs of central bank intervention. Moreover, it would, arguably, better
insulate the ￿nancial system against coordination failures at early stages, therefore
helping to eliminate systemic liquidity risk.
4 A description of the current turmoil
The whole discussion above could be merely academic, but recent events in ￿nancial
markets seem to validate the theoretical reasoning presented. In what follows we
are going to give a short description of the recent events and discuss them in the
light of the literature presented above.
In order to understand the events, a simple snapshot of ￿nancial engineering
workings in modern banking is needed. In the new banking environment of ￿orig-
inate and distribute￿ , banks originated loans (in the forms of mortgages and other
assets), repackaged the cash-￿ ows generated by these loans in Mortgage Backed
Securities (MBSs) and Asset Backed Securities (ABS)40, and sold-on (distributed)
these securities to investors. The selling in most cases was not direct, but via Special
40An ABS is essentially the same thing as a mortgage-backed security (MBS), except that the
securities backing it are assets such as loans, leases, credit card debt, a company￿ s receivables,
royalties and so on, and not mortgage-based securities.
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appearing as o⁄-balance sheet liabilities of the bank. In their turn, the SPVs held
the ABSs and issued (short-term) Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP)42 to
fund potentially illiquid longer-term securities. Given the maturity mismatch of
this investment, sponsoring banks had undertaken to provide them with backstop
liquidity via credit lines, if required. This highly complicated structure created
liquidity by banks and satis￿ed various degrees of investor￿ s risk appetites, but was
sensitive, as proved, to stress in the economy (for an analytical exposition of the
causes and events, see ECB, 2007).
Such stress originated with the sharp decline in the credit quality in US sub-
prime mortgage markets, due to an increase in the number of delinquencies already
from early 2007, which impacted on the fundamentals of structured credit instru-
ments. The subsequent rating downgrades and the realisation that risk assessment
and pricing methods for such complex instruments were inadequate, increased un-
certainty related to the fundamentals of ABSs and created market (trading) frictions
and translated to wide spreads up to the point where ABS markets dried-up. As a
result there was a sharp decline in the issuance volumes of Collaterised Debt/Loan
Obligations (CDOs/ LDOs), which, amid growing uncertainties towards such instru-
ments, lead to widespread refusal by investors to maintain their ABCPs when they
matured. This lead to re￿nancing problems of the SPVs, which had to draw on their
committed credit lines from their sponsoring banks. Given the aggregate large ex-
posures, emergency rescues from a number of other banks had to be arranged. As a
consequence a number of credit institutions failed, large global palyers among them
(IKB, Northern Rock, Sachsen LB, Bear Stearns, Lehmann Brothers), others well
sold (Merryl Lynch), and others received large capital injections by governments
(AIG, Citigroup, Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac, Indie Mac, Dexia, Fortis, HypoVere-
41A discussion of the di⁄erences between a conduit and an SIV can be found in ECB, 2007 (FSR,
Dec 2007, Box 8).
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(UBS, Deutsche Bank. etc). Eventually, banks with liquid balances tended to hoard
liquidity, for fear of counterparty credit risk and uncertainty about the amount of
liquidity in their balance sheets. This situation caused a serious deadlock to the
interbank (unsecured) market, with banks not being able to get funding for terms
longer than one or two weeks. As a result, money market spreads shot up, which
made central bank intermediation necessary43.
Central banks around the globe reacted di⁄erently by changing their operational
framework, or changing their monetary policy stance or both. Common reactions
from major central banks (the ECB, the Fed and the BoE) included the provision
of extraordinary amount of liquidity to the markets through a combination of long-
term and short-term open market operations, as well as through internationally
coordinated actions (i.e. currency swap agreements between the ECB and the Fed).
In the case of the ECB, an active liquidity policy based on clear front loading of
reserves via main re￿nancing operations gave way to the temporary introduction
of ￿xed rate - full allotment liquidity in their main re￿nancing operations and a
narrower corridor of standing facilities. The BoE, after an initial period of non-
responding to the turmoil, was forced by the circumstances into intervention after
the hit on Northern Rock (a solvent, but illiquid mortgage lender, who su⁄ered a
run). It responded by exploiting the ￿ exibility of its operational reserve framework.
The Fed￿ s reaction was to slash interest rates, while providing ample liquidity both
through changes in the discount window (TAs) and OMOs. Discussions about the
stigma related to TAs (i.e. the use of the discount window or the marginal lending
facilities) emerged, especially for the case of the US. Overall, this experience was
e⁄ectively a stress testing on the liquidity management of the central banks, given
their need to adjust their liquidity provision practices to rapidly and unexpectedly
changing demand patterns.
43For a more intricate analysis of the causes and the development of the early stages of the
turmoil, see ECB (2008).
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scribed in the sections above. To begin with, the roots of liquidity risk stem from
securitisation practices combined with the market￿ s inability to keep up with them
in terms of risk assessment, pricing and management. This combination ultimately
enhanced rather than subdued information asymmetries concerning these instru-
ments and their distribution of risks in the ￿nancial system (i.e. where do the risks
in the ￿nancial system end up?). Moreover, although markets became deeper, serv-
ing wider and increasing investment risk appetites, they were still short of becoming
more complete, as was clear from the downturn during the turmoil.
The link between funding and market liquidity risks in the new business model
of banks become apparent. Funding liquidity risk, borne by incomplete markets
and asymmetries in information relating to these new ￿nancial products, lead to
moral hazard in investing, i.e. to a situation where banks economised on costly
liquid assets, while investing on illiquid and riskier assets. This lead to coordi-
nation failure among both depositors (i.e. the bank run on Northern Rock) and,
predominantly, among market participants (both interbank and the asset markets
for structured products), resulting into market liquidity risk. Behind the deadlock
in the money markets lie the already discussed adverse selection problem borne by
uncertainties about counterparty credit risk and about their own exposure borne
by market valuations. At the same time, asset markets experienced typical symp-
toms such as ￿re sales and trade frictions (due to margin calls, trader￿ s risk limits,
thinning of trading volumes etc.). This has facilitated second round and spiralling
e⁄ects, which enhanced the fast propagation of risk between funding and market
liquidity. Essentially, funding liquidity risk spread to the ABS market, from there
to SPVs funding liquidity, which lead to ABCPs market liquidity risk. Then risk
moved back to banks￿funding liquidity, propagating itself to the interbank market
liquidity. These multiple round e⁄ects were repeated and enhanced in each round,
creating downward spirals in liquidity, which brought asset and interbank markets
41
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Finally, the important role of central bank liquidity, as well as its limits were
also highlighted. In the absence of a well-functioning interbank market central
banks faced signs of increasing instability in the ￿nancial system and raising money
market rates. Their reaction was to intervene by o⁄ering liquidity into the money
market, although the aim, methods and e⁄ectiveness of the major central banks
were quite di⁄erent. Abstracting from criticising the decisions of each bank, their
reactions showed that one rule cannot serve all, as indeed is the suggestion of the
relevant literature. However, the limits of central bank intervention also sprung
up. Namely, although the operating toolbox of banks was in many cases reshu› ed
and extended, it became clear that central bank interventions alone cannot stabilise
the situation in an environment of such intense information asymmetry and adverse
selection. More than a year after and the turmoil is not dented yet, while banks
appear to be increasingly reliant on central bank money. The role of supervision
and regulation is brought forward once more, and already, corrective actions in the
regulatory and supervisory framework of ￿nancial markets and banks in particular
are being discussed at a high (global) level in order to establish better transparency
in the banking system in order to face the root of liquidity risk44.
5 Policy recommendations and conclusions
The above analysis provides useful policy considerations:
- Within the ￿nancial system one can distinguish three broad liquidity types, the
central bank liquidity, the funding liquidity and the market liquidity. These liquidity
types su¢ ciently capture the workings of the ￿nancial system (at an aggregate level).
44It is nevertheless argued that ine⁄ective regulation also played a role in the current turmoil.
Basel III had arguably put a lot of weight on rating agencies in the risk assessment of innovative
￿nancial products. As already discussed, the rating agencies did not manage to keep up with the
evolution of the products and their increasingly complicated nature, thereby enhancing mispricing
and market illiquidity, when their mistake was realised. Therefore, the need for e⁄ective regulation
should yet again be stressed.
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have positive or negative e⁄ects on ￿nancial stability. In smooth ￿nancial periods
the e⁄ects are positive and help to redistribute liquidity in the system in an e¢ cient
and unobstructed way, so that, overall, liquidity does not matter. It is merely the
oil greasing the wheels of the ￿nancial system, so that they function frictionless and
costless. Nevertheless, smooth periods do not last for ever.
- Turbulent periods, which relate to heightened liquidity risk, appear in a rare
and episodic, yet intense manner and can destabilise the ￿nancial system. The
causes of liquidity risk lie on departures from the complete markets and symmetric
information paradigm, which can lead to moral hazard and adverse selection. To
the extent that such conditions persist, liquidity risk is endemic in the ￿nancial
system and can cause a vicious link between funding and market liquidity, prompting
systemic liquidity risk. The latter is exactly this type of market risk that typically
alerts policy makers, because of its potential to destabilise the ￿nancial system. In
such cases emergency liquidity provisions can be a tool to restore balance.
-The central bank has the ability and the obligation to minimise the real costs of
liquidations and the probability of a ￿nancial system meltdown. However, the role
of central bank liquidity in such turbulent periods does not have guaranteed success,
as it cannot tackle the roots of liquidity risk. In essence, it only focuses on halting
(temporarily) the vicious circle between funding and market liquidity. However,
its function can be hindered by the same causes of liquidity risk. The crux of the
problem lies on the fact that the central bank cannot distinguish between illiquid
and insolvent banks with certainty. Therefore, by providing liquidity to undeserving
institutions it could potentially cause further damage to the system. This may
happen because it actually hurts the funding liquidity of solvent but illiquid banks,
the prospects of market liquidity (by risking to demoralise the ￿nancial system
and thus increase systemic liquidity risk) and its own functions (i.e. by admitting
counterparty credit risk in its portfolio or risk its monetary policy objectives). In
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in the ￿nancial system liquidity. The tradeo⁄ between the bene￿ts and costs of
intervention should be taken into account when the central bank has to decide on
its liquidity providing strategy. This task is not easy and there is no established
rule of thumb.
- In order to eliminate systemic liquidity risk, greater transparency of liquidity
management practices are needed. Supervision and regulation are the fundamental
weapons against systemic liquidity crises. These practices can tackle the root of
liquidity risks by minimising asymmetric information and moral hazard through
e⁄ective monitoring mechanisms of the ￿nancial system. In this way it is easier
to distinguish between solvent and illiquid agents and therefore impose liquidity
cushions to the ones most in need. This would also help markets become more
complete. In the best case scenario, when such mechanisms function e⁄ectively,
the role of the central banks as a liquidity provider could be redundant (market
discipline would be su¢ cient). However, such mechanisms can be costly, due to
the amount of information that needs to be gathered. They should, therefore, be
run by the most cost e¢ cient and result-e⁄ective agent. If market discipline is not
enough to install its own peer-monitoring rules and regulations at a lower cost, they
should be managed by the central bank.
- Last, but not least, this project has demonstrated the importance of liquidity
risk in the ￿nancial system stability. Liquidity risk can always be present and there-
fore should be clearly taken into consideration (priced) in policy relevant variables
needed to draw conclusions on monetary policy strategy. The need to do that is
most important during turbulent times, when liquidity premia increase and there-
fore the information from asset prices, relevant for the policy makers, is distorted
if these premia are not properly accounted for. However, measuring such liquidity
premia becomes even harder during such periods, due to the stochastic nature of
feedback e⁄ects and ampli￿cation mechanisms at work during such periods, which
increase the complexity of liquidity ￿ ows in the system.
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The scope of central bank liquidity intervention and the nature of optimal interven-
tion policies has received considerable amount of attention in the literature. The
basis of discussion goes back to the argument of Bagehot (1873) who expressed the
fundamental, classical view on this issue. He argues that the central bank should
be known to be ready to lend without limits to any solvent bank against
good collateral and in penalty rates, so that banks do not use them to fund
their current operations. In what follows we are going to review the opinions of-
fered by the existing literature on each of the above issues in an e⁄ort to see where
we currently stand45.
Should a central bank be ready to lend? Goodfriend and King (1988)
introduce a line of research suggesting that the central bank is by no means more
e⁄ective in o⁄ering emergency liquidity assistance in the presence of a well func-
tioning, deregulated, uncollateralised interbank market. Such a market can better
cope with the issues of asymmetric information and moral hazard, because e⁄ec-
tive peer monitoring can introduce market discipline and accumulate information
about the liquidity and solvency status of a bank in a more cost e¢ cient way than
central bank supervision. Widespread costly liquidations and systemic risk could
rationalise intervention, however, it is not always clear ex-post whether disruption
costs associated with costly liquidations are big enough. Moreover, intervention
policies targeted at promoting ￿nancial market stability can encourage risk taking
(moral hazard) and lead to the deterioration of private liquidity provision (adverse
selection), when the central bank cannot distinguish between illiquid and insolvent
banks. Under these conditions, the need of central bank intervention policies to
avoid short term but widespread costly liquidations or in the face of systemic risk
is not explicit.
45See Freixas et al. (1999) for an interesting literature review on issues related to the need, the
role and the e⁄ects of the central bank as a LLR.
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work e⁄ectively. Nevertheless, a long strand of research provided evidence that
central bank intervention is needed when the interbank market fails to redistribute
liquidity in the system (Flannery, 1996; Freixas et al., 1999; Freixas et al., 2004) and
costly liquidation (costs of bank runs) is involved (Allen and Gale, 1998; Acharya
et al., 2007). In such cases, the central bank should intervene despite the potential
moral hazard and the credit risk that the central bank may assume.
Should a central bank be known to be ready to lend? Linked to the dis-
cussion of whether the central bank should intervene is the question of ￿constructive
ambiguity￿versus the intervention pre-commitment. The dichotomy between them
is propelled by the feedback e⁄ect from liquidity provision to risk-taking incentives
of ￿nancial intermediaries. The argument goes as follows: A pre-committed central
bank emergency liquidity provision may act as a public insurance against aggregate
risk in an incomplete market economy. In other words, it may increase expectations
that the institution is insured against mismanagement of virtually all types of risk,
including credit and market risk (Freixas et al., 1999). This could increase the
incentives of ￿nancial intermediaries to free ride on liquidity by investing more on
risky, high-yield investments (Repullo, 2005)46. Such investments could, on the one
hand increase the capital stock and therefore the output of the economy in good
states (Sauer, 2007), but could result to excessively low liquidity in the bad states
due to dynamic consistency problems (Cao and Illing, 2007) and a deterioration of
private liquidity provision (Goodfriend and King, 1988). ￿Constructive ambiguity￿
with respect to the conduct of the central bank in crisis situations should strengthen
market discipline and mitigate the scope for moral hazard, in contrast to a commit-
ted bailout policy. It should be particularly e⁄ective in reducing moral hazard if
coupled with procedures for punishing managers and shareholders for imprudent
46Indeed, the presence of a LLR is shown to in￿ uence the level of the optimal bu⁄er of liquid
assets. In fact, the share of safe assets in the bank￿ s portfolio decreases with the introduction of a
LLR. Gonzalez-Eiras (2003) provides empirical support for this line of reasoning.
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The literature provides mixed suggestions over the issue. A number of studies
endorse the constructive ambiguity discipline (Freixas, 2000; Freixas et al., 2004),
where the bank optimises ex-post, given the costs related to rescuing policies or the
source of moral hazard48. However, Easly and O￿ Hara (2007) suggest that ambiguity
is in fact not constructive, because uncertainty could reduce market participation
and further exacerbate illiquidity. Flannery (1996) also supports pre-commitment
but for di⁄erent reasons. He argues that in the absence of well-functioning inter
bank markets the central bank should be subsidising liquidity and should pre-commit
to o⁄er it. Finally, Rochet and Vives (2004) present a compromising view. They
argue that in one type of equilibrium, the LLR policy is e¢ cient if the central bank
can commit. If it cannot and instead optimises ex-post, it will end up intervening
too often.
In any case, the decision of pre-commitment is tightly linked to the decision of
the lending rate, because the moral hazard could be overcome by lending at penalty
rates (Bagehot, 1873). We are, therefore turning our attention to this question.
Should a central bank lend at penalty rates? This question would be
irrelevant in the absence of moral hazard and adverse selection. Indeed, in such a
situation central banks￿help via the discount window lending should be at a very
low rate whenever the bank is solvent. It avoids early closure and the central bank
47See Freixas et al. (1999) for a literature review on the sources and e⁄ects of moral hazard
in central bank emergency lending and a more detailed discussion on the issue of constructive
ambiguity versus precommittment.
48Freixas (2000) adopts a model where intervention is conditional on the amount of uninsured
debt issued by the defaulting bank. Yet in equilibrium, because the rescue policy is costly, the
central bank will not rescue all the banks that ful￿ll the uninsured debt requirement condition,
but will follow a mixed strategy, thereby adhering to the creative ambiguity property.
Freixas et al. (2004) stress the importance of costly screening of loan applicants, which results
at insolvent banks posing as illiquid banks and trying to ￿gamble for resurrection￿(i.e. invests
in projects of negative net present value). In such cases it may be desirable for the central bank
to intervene as a Lender of Last Resort so as to appease the problems of insu¢ cient supervision
(i.e. limit the excessive liquidation of assets by illiquid banks). If the screening is successful (i.e.
supervision is su¢ cient) then interbank market can e¢ ciently peer-monitor borrowers and there is
no role for an LLR.
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presence of moral hazard, however, insolvent banks may pose for merely illiquid
banks. The argument goes that penalty rates would discourage insolvent banks
from borrowing as if they were merely illiquid (Freixas et al., 2004). It therefore
acts as a mechanism of discerning illiquid from insolvent banks. Nevertheless,
there are arguments against lending at penalty rates. Goodfriend and King (1988)
argue that it increases the cost of liquidity for illiquid but solvent banks, which can
render these banks unable to repay (Flannery, 1996)49. This will increase the cost
of intervention for the central bank (Flannery, 1996), but can also aggravate the
bank￿ s crisis: It can send a negative signal to the market, which may precipitate an
untimely run or give managers the incentive to ￿gamble for resurrection￿(Freixas
et al., 1999). Such costs however depend on the ability of the central bank to
discern illiquid from insolvent banks, an issue that lies in the heart of the optimal
intervention policy discussion.
Should a central bank lend only to solvent banks? Lending to sol-
vent banks would be optimal because it would minimise costs of intermediation and
reduce moral hazard. However, Goodhart (1987) implies that this condition is di¢ -
cult to satisfy, if only because it is di¢ cult to discern illiquidity from insolvency. A
number of reasons can make screening di¢ cult, for example insu¢ cient information
on the bank in need, especially given the need for fast and timely action in crises
periods, ine⁄ective monitoring or uncertainty on the time horizon over which an
illiquid bank can ultimately become insolvent (Freixas et al., 1999). Whatever the
reason, the problem of screening is the crux of the central bank lending. As Good-
friend and King (1988) argue, in a world of perfect and costless information, illiquid
banks would be distinguished from insolvent banks and would be able to borrow
the present value of their expected income stream, discounted at a rate properly
49In fact, Flannery (1996) argues that in a crisis, when it may not be possible to discern solvent
banks (i.e. even in the presence of moral hazard), the central bank must stand ready to subsidize
credit, otherwise it may su⁄er a winner￿ s curse, in the sense that solvent banks may not a⁄ord to
repay, thereby increasing its cost of intervention.
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it is solvent. However, with incomplete and costly information, it is only possible
to lend to any bank at a pooled rate applying to all banks. This rate would entail a
premium, related to liquidity risk due to asymmetric information. This could lead
to adverse selection in lending, which would penalise solvent banks and induce fur-
ther moral hazard related to risk-prone behaviour by banks. Therefore, screening
loan applicants may not always be feasible and becomes a more severe problem in
times of market distress, because of increased adverse selection (Flannery, 1996).
What should be the appropriate action in the absence of e⁄ective screening?
Goodfriend and King (1988) suggest that the central bank should not intervene
at all in such cases, leaving the interbank market to do the job. Freixas et al.
(2004) argue that the interbank market may not be as e¢ cient as Goodfriend and
King suggests in screening loan applicants. In that case, there is a role for central
bank emergency liquidity intervention, in order to appease problems of insu¢ cient
supervision (i.e. limit the excessive liquidation of assets by illiquid banks). Finally,
Rochet and Vives (2004) argue that even if solvent banks cannot be distinguished,
coordination failures in the interbank market can warrant the intervention of the
central bank in ways that appear to contradict Bagehot￿ s view, i.e. they identify
cases when the central bank should be involved in early, corrective actions, even for
insolvent banks and not at penalty rates. Along this line, Flannery (1996) also
argues in favour of providing liquidity to all needy banks, as long as only very short-
term, emergency loans are extended in cases of broad ￿nancial crises. In such cases,
the potential bene￿ts from the central bank loans far outweigh the likely damage
to the banking system￿ s risk-taking investments. Overall, the literature holds that,
if illiquid banks cannot be distinguished form insolvent ones, it is better to lend to
everyone, provided that social costs are high.
Should a central bank lend only against good collateral?
Lending only against good collateral could help screen insolvent from illiquid
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risk for the central bank. As Padoa-Schioppa (1999) mentioned, ￿the probability
that a modern bank is solvent, but illiquid, and at the same time lacks su¢ cient
collateral to obtain regular central bank funding is ...quite small.￿ Indeed, the
relevant literature seems to agree that central bank lending should be made against
collateral, with only few exceptions50. However, there are issues pertaining to the
composition and the market liquidity of the collateral.
Regarding the composition of the collateral, it is not clear whether central banks
should only accept good collateral. Good collateral may not be abundant or avail-
able. In that case, accepting only good collateral or relatively simple and trans-
parent instruments could ultimately come into con￿ ict with the authorities￿respon-
sibility for ￿nancial stability, limiting their capacity to act as liquidity provider of
last resort to the markets most in need (Eichengreen, 2008). The issue is, therefore,
how far a central bank should widen the range of assets accepted as collateral51. It
could be argued that the central bank can accept a wide range of collateral, because
the central bank can rely on its outstanding currency liabilities to remain almost
in perpetuity, therefore it can absorb market and liquidity risk (Goodhart, 2008).
Moreover, allowing less liquid securities, or those denominated in other currencies, to
be used as collateral at central bank lending facilities or in other contexts could also
improve liquidity conditions (Caruana and Kodres, 2008), because the willingness
of central banks to accept as collateral certain classes of assets will in turn a⁄ect
the liquidity of such assets (Goodhart, 2008). The counter argument suggests that
owing to asymmetric information, the central bank is likely to be o⁄ered the worst
50Flannery (1996) argues that a bank￿ s decision to pledge collateral or sell assets can materially
a⁄ect its unsecured creditor￿ s ability to obtain repayment if the ￿rm defaults, resulting to higher
unsecured debt rates, which may depress banking ￿rms values in other ways.
51A usual practice by banks is to cross pledge collateral. Such cross pledging is in general
warranted, since it allows using diversi￿cation between di⁄erent sources of risk for economizing on
collateral. However, it requires su¢ cient independence between payment risks and other forms of
liquidity risk, as well as a constant coordination between the Central Bank (who is sometimes in
charge of monitoring the LVPSs) and the Banking Supervisors (Rochet, 2008)
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In that case, the central bank accepts credit risk, while allowing the bank to access
the market with its better collateral (Goodhart, 2008). However, the general view
holds that the central bank should be willing to accept some losses due to extended
range of collateral, in order to address interbank market failures (i.e. hoarding of
liquidity by a few market agents as described by Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer,
2008).
Moreover, the market liquidity of collateral may vary, which would a⁄ect the
funding liquidity of banks. Regarding the market liquidity of collateral, in times of
crises, collateral values tend to fall to only a fraction of their pre-crisis levels, when
banks engage in ￿re-sales of their assets and collateral assets that back loans are
marked to market. This makes collateral subject to systemic risk (Cifuentes et al.,
2005). Changes in collateral values result to adjusted values for margin calls and
haircuts (Brunnemeyer and Pedersen, 2007). Under such circumstances, banks are
vulnerable to changes in the value and market liquidity of the underlying collateral,
because they may have to provide additional collateral at short notice, which a⁄ects
their funding liquidity risk (Flannery, 1996). The more widely collateralisation is
used, the more signi￿cant this risk becomes, especially as market price movements
result in changes in the size of counterparty credit exposures (IMF, 2008).
Should a central bank provide liquidity through targeted assistance
(TA) or through Open Market Operations (OMOs)? By TA we mean
liquidity support to individual institutions whereas OMOs refer to lending to the
market as a whole. On a more technical level, TA refers to liquidity provision
through the discount lending window (or marginal lending facilities), as opposed to
a broad liquidity assistance though OMOs (or main re￿nancing operations -MROs-
for the case of the ECB)52. Overall, both can induce moral hazard in di⁄erent ways;
52There are substantial di⁄erences between the liquidity operational framework between the Fed
and the ECB. In the Fed the discount window is distint as a monetary policy tool from open
market operations. Only a few banks have access to it and the basic discount rate can be adjusted
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market and monetary policy goals of the central bank.
Starting with the arguments in favor of broad liquidity assistance, the main func-
tion of OMOs is the implementation of monetary policy, and they are alone su¢ cient
for this purpose (Goodfriend and King, 1989). Therefore, OMOs make sense when
the central bank needs to control market rates. This can be particularly important
in cases of liquidity crunches when the elevated market rate increases liquidation
costs (Rochet and Vives, 2004)53. It can also be rationalised in cases of generalised
liquidity shortages, where support should be provided to the market as a whole
(Freixas et al., 1999). Furthermore, broad liquidity provision can minimise the
social costs borne from moral hazard, i.e. the risk-prone behaviour of banks that
are inherent in TAs, when the central bank ends up supporting insolvent institu-
tions (Kaufman, 1991 and Schwartz, 1992) or institutions which rely on TAs on the
grounds that they are Too-Big-To-Fail (Rochet and Tirole, 1996; Freixas, 1999)54.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Fur￿ne (2001) provides empirical evidence of
banks￿reluctance to borrow from the discount window for fear of the stigma asso-
ciated with it, an issue that is typically overlooked in the above models. Such a
problem typically does not occur in OMOs. Nevertheless, lending to the market as
a whole would mainly rely on the existence of a well functioning interbank market,
which would e⁄ectively redistribute the liquidity in the system.
In the absence of such an interbank mechanism, the literature argues that TAs
from time to time in a more judgmental manner than the ECB marginal lending rate. In a sense,
it is easier to see why the literature, which is based on US data, treats TA in the sense of borrowing
from the discount window. Finally, note that in the case of the ECB, marginal lending facilities
are included in OMOs. The equivalent of the US OMOs is the MROs of the ECB.
53However, the authors mention that if the central bank cannot distinguish between illiquid
and insolvent banks, then a central bank is most likely to make losses, irrespective of the type of
operation.
54A bank can be deemed too-big-to-fail when its failure may trigger a chain of subsequent failures.
Goodhart and Huang (1999) produce a rational for the Too-Big-to-Fail doctorine, arguing that
the threat to ￿nancial stability related to the size of the failed bank. However, in Rochet and
Tirole (1996) this too big to fail policy can be avoided by subsidizing the troubled institution￿ s
counterparties instead of bailing out the troubled ￿rm itself.
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Flannery (1996) talks about distorted risk-taking investments induced by a policy of
lending broadly to banks, regardless of their credit condition. He argues that OMO
cannot replace TA, in cases of broad market crises, where the interbank market
is severely impaired and cannot redistribute liquidity to market participants who
really need it. In that case, OMOs would not solve the problem, whereas TAs in
the form of discount window lending could assure the fastest and most cost-e¢ cient
means of resolving the crisis. In a similar note, Ewerhart and Valla (2008) show
that open market operations would invite moral hazard, given that banks in distress
and ￿greedy￿investors would compete for excess funding provided during the crisis,
given frictions in the interbank market.
What is the role of monetary policy stance in crisis periods? Liquid-
ity implementation policies can act independent or not from the monetary policy
stance. In crisis periods, the central bank might choose to change its stance, if the
malfunctioning of liquidity linkages in the ￿nancial system is perceived to have an
e⁄ect in the real economy or the long-term targets of the central bank (e.g. induce
changes to the monetary policy strategy)55. On the other hand, a central bank
may be reluctant to respond fully to large liquidity shocks, because of the risk of
mitigating the ￿nal monetary policy targets, such as in￿ ation levels (e.g. in cases of
unsterilised liquidity interventions, Sauer, 2007), because of fearing the need to take
opposite action at a later time, a practice that has been felt could provide mixed
signals of the central bank￿ s policy stance (Bartolini and Prati, 2003) or because
of the risk of fuelling moral hazard in lending and thus encouraging further crises.
More precisely, expansionary monetary policies in times of crises may propel moral
hazard, resulting to aggressive search for yield by investors, increased risk appetite
and over-investing, ￿nally destabilising the ￿nancial system and creating vagabond-
55Thorbecke (1997) argues that monetary policy responds to macroeconomic rather ￿nancial
factors. Eisfeldt (2004), however, develops a model where endogenous ￿ uctuations in market
liquidity are correlated with real fundamentals such as productivity and investment.
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and Ho⁄mann, 2007; ECB, 2007).
We focus on the role of the monetary policy in a⁄ecting market and funding
liquidity during crises. As will be seen, monetary policy stance can a⁄ect market
and funding liquidity and the other way round. Whether the central bank should
separate the monetary policy stance from its liquidity implementation framework
depends on the institutional set-up and the operational objectives of each central
bank and are not discussed in this project.
Looking at the direction from monetary policy stance to market and funding
liquidity, an accommodative monetary policy stance raises the supply of highly liq-
uid assets and should lower the expected costs of converting less liquid assets into
cash (Berger and Harjes, 2007), thereby stimulating funding liquidity and market
liquidity. More precisely, a corrective monetary policy during a ￿nancial crisis could
inspire con￿dence about the fundamentals of the economy, reduce the credit costs
(and risks) of outstanding bank loans, loosen re￿nancing conditions (i.e. central
bank liquidity) and help stabilise ￿nancial markets, thereby potentially reducing
the causes of coordination failures and restoring the good functioning of liquidity
linkages. At a microstructural level, monetary policy stance can enhance fund-
ing and market liquidity by loosening trading constraints during periods of market
turbulence. More speci￿cally, a loose monetary policy stance can a⁄ect liquidity
by altering the terms of margin borrowing and alleviating borrowing constraints of
dealers (Garcia, 1989), thereby reducing costs on margin loan requirements, and
enhancing the ability of dealers to ￿nance their positions (Brunnemeier and Peder-
sen, 2007). Subsequent fund ￿ ows into stock and bond markets can a⁄ect trading
activity and thereby in￿ uence market liquidity (Chordia et al. 2005).
On the other hand, reduced liquidity and increased volatility could spur the cen-
tral bank to soften or at least not toughen its monetary stance, to the extent that
they have real e⁄ects on the economy (Chordia et al., 2005). Empirical evidence on
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central bank should lower interest rates to prevent ￿re sales of assets by distressed
banks which have to restore their capital adequacy requirements in turbulent pe-
riods. Freixas and Jose (2007) argue against rate hikes in crisis periods, claiming
that under asymmetric information in the interbank market the e⁄ect of a monetary
policy tightening combines with quantity rationing in the bank loan market and re-
inforces each other, propagating larger shocks than merely the ones caused by the
monetary policy. Nevertheless, looking at the longer run consequences, it might be
that monetary policy stance creates an environment of cheap liquidity for everyone,
thereby loosening market discipline and stimulating moral hazard in investing. As a
consequence, more risky and therefore less liquid investments will be made, leading
to future liquidity crises (Ioannidou et al., 2007).
The role of central bank: A review. Looking back to the analysis on the
role of the central banks in crisis periods, we see that it is signi￿cant, but it does
not necessarily have guaranteed success. More precisely, the main problem in pro-
viding emergency liquidity assistance by a central bank is that, in an environment
of incomplete markets and asymmetric information the central bank can not dis-
tinguish between an illiquid and an insolvent bank. Under such conditions, the
e¢ ciency and e⁄ectiveness of any actions by the central bank will be constrained
and uncertain57. Ultimately, it could be argued that the optimal rule for central
bank intervention is decided on a cost trade-o⁄ analysis. From the one hand, the
central bank faces the danger of welfare costs due to costly bank runs and forced
liquidations. On the other hand, it has to be prepared to face spiralling costs linked
to excessive risk-taking, the possibility of future liquidity crises (related to the moral
56Chordia et al. (2005) ￿nd evidence that policy stance declined signi￿cantly (by about 33%) in
the crisis period relative to the non-crisis period, suggesting loosened monetary policy (in the US)
is associated with a contemporaneous increase in equity market liquidity during crises.
57Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) argue that a Central Bank can tackle interbank inef-
￿ciencies by standing to lend to a⁄ected banks, provided it has greater information about banks
(for example, through supervision) compared to the outside markets, or absent such information
access, it is prepared to make some loss-making loans.
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collateral value that it accepts)58 and the risk of compromising its monetary policy
objectives (Sauer, 2007). The decision, timing and form of intervention can de-
pend on the relative weights of these costs (Sauer, 2007). A su¢ cient framework
for allocating optimal weights is, as of yet, not presented in the literature and most
research indicates multiple equilibria solutions (Cao and Illing, 2007; Sauer, 2007).
58This can be counterparty credit risk, liquidity risk and market risk. The central bank can
shield against the latter two types, by keeping collateral liabilities to eternity, but cannot shield
against the ￿rst one, and therefore should be prudential about the amounts that it receives, given
that it can result to loss of public money.
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